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DECREASING UNINTENTIONAL WAR: 
GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
REGULATING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS 
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
By Aiden Warren* & Alek Hillas+ 
ABSTRACT 
While the introduction of futuristic technologies will establish new options and precedents for state 
responses to security scenarios, there are important lessons to be drawn from prior crises. Beginning 
with a case study of newly sworn-in leaders during their first major foreign policy ‘test,’ this article 
envisions changes to such security scenarios with reference to the development of policies on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Leadership perceptions and the politics of human 
versus machine error, or sharing accountability of fault by states, is considered in the context of a 
detailed thought experiment. The second section of the article identifies enhanced collaborative rules 
for decreasing the probability of unintentional war at the level of military officers. The final section 
considers possible avenues to implement restrictions on LAWS in conventional warfare through 
various arms control models. Through the article’s focus on existing architectures of global 
governance, readers will be presented with an analysis of the challenges that may confront future 
political leaders and technical experts in the field of emerging technologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The development of complex and emerging technologies in 
settings of conflict presents distinctive challenges to global security. As 
this article will discuss, particular concern often relates to their 
management, and the principled and legally ‘permissible’ arguments 
that encircle them. Although the apprehensions pertaining to drones 
have been deliberated widely, it is the trajectory of Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (LAWS) which has now deepened the debate in this 
area among those working as military strategists for uninhabited 
systems, specialists of international humanitarian law, and ethicists 
working in artificial intelligence (AI). While the international 
community has not come to an agreement on a classification for 
LAWS, the most important disparity between existing weapons 
systems and LAWS is that humans would not directly command the 
LAWS to execute or kill a specific target. In this regard, the machine 
would come to its own decision independently within the parameters of 
its algorithm and mission specifications. 
The activities LAWS would be permitted to carry out 
legitimately is a key policy consideration. In articulating the emerging 
scope of these “machines with the power and discretion to take lives 
without human involvement,” António Guterres has told the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) that LAWS “must be prohibited by 
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international law,”1 and has attempted to provide leadership direction, 
most recently during an address to the Web Summit in December 2020 
where he reiterated his call for a ban on LAWS.2 As noted in the 
Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation released in 
2020, Guterres’ call was also matched by a recommendation from a 
High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation that he convened, co-chaired 
by Melinda Gates and Jack Ma. Here, the main emphasis was that, “life 
and death decisions should not be delegated to machines,”3 
necessitating that such “priority actions deserve immediate attention,” 
so as to spur human rights and human agency.4 Guterres also 
announced his intention to seek a second five-year term from 2022.5 
Should his bid be successful, Guterres will remain as the Secretary-
General until the end of 2026, where he will most likely continue to 
push for state action on LAWS. Governance considerations for 
LAWS, thus, will most likely continue to expand into a range of areas, 
 
 1 Press Release, U.N. Security Council, COVID-19 Pandemic Amplifying, 
Exploiting World’s Fragilities, Secretary-General Tells Security Council Debate on 




 2 U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s message to Web Summit 




 3 U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: 





 4 U.N. Secretary-General, The Age of Digital Interdependence: Report of the UN 




 5 Guterres to seek second five-year term as UN Secretary-General, UN NEWS (Jan. 11, 
2021), https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081832 [http://web.archive.org
/web/20210112120831/https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/01/1081832]. 
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including efforts to ‘decrease’ unintentional war, the subject of this 
article. 
While no one can forecast with confidence the actions of 
LAWS, specialists from a multiplicity of professions across the public 
and private sectors must contemplate policies to decrease 
unintentional armed conflict involving LAWS. Such policies would be 
especially applicable for political leaders, who are more likely to be 
involved as the decisionmakers in response to an act that could be 
interpreted as either an accident or a provocation. Politicians may be 
responsible in deciding whether a ‘skirmish’ would veer into the 
direction of a diplomatic stand-off, or instead continue towards 
becoming a military activity. In endeavoring to provide much needed 
conjunctive material to these multifaceted discussions, this article will 
begin with a review of political responses during the critical junctures 
of potential hostilities, providing a case study on crisis response for 
new leaders. The article also identifies enhanced collaboration rules for 
decreasing the probability of unintentional wars at the officer level. 
Finally, it considers possible avenues to implement restrictions on 
LAWS in conventional warfare through various arms control models. 
I. LEADERSHIP AND SECURITY SCENARIO REACTIONS 
When political leaders opt to use force or to de-escalate a 
conflict in response to an incident, traditionally, the notion has been 
that antagonists could be relied upon to be logical actors whose 
pursuits can be defined and understood. However, when considering 
how to respond to a crisis where LAWS are present, it may be 
conceivable for robots to have coding inaccuracies. Conversely, it 
could be difficult to ascertain the chain of command and the 
supervision of LAWS from civilian or military authorities (or even 
non-state actors). In short, how would politicians respond differently 
to an incident where it is more difficult to determine a state’s intent, 
due to the inclusion of a machine ‘actor’? The section below engages 
with the notion that reactions by leaders in volatile scenarios 
(particularly newly sworn-in leaders), can be viewed as ‘heightened’ 
decisions in which the politician is facing a foreign policy ‘test’ or crisis. 
It is instructive, therefore, to consider how previous presidents have 
been confronted with ambiguous security incidents within months of 
2021 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 9:2 
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their inauguration, and to consider as a thought experiment whether 
new variables could be introduced in the future by the possible 
presence of uninhabited, autonomous devices. 
An interesting historical example, which will be considered 
below, is the April 2001 South China Sea collision which occurred early 
in George W. Bush’s first term. The selection of this incident is not 
intended to indicate that other presidents have not also had their 
resolve tested early during their first term. In March 2009, Chinese 
ships and aircraft harassed U.S. vessels in such a manner the Director 
of National Intelligence testified to the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that such actions constituted the “most serious” encounter 
since the April 2001 incident, with President Obama meeting that 
month with China’s foreign minister in the White House.6 While 
intercepts in May and July 2017, early into the term of President 
Trump, had by then become more routine,7 it is possible President 
Biden may soon face challenges in response to encounters involving 
the military. Three significant events occurred in January 2021. A week 
before the Biden inauguration, the Trump Administration declassified 
and released the 2018 U.S. Strategic Framework for the Pacific, 
previously classified as “secret” and “not for foreign nationals.”8  
Initially to be declassified in the 2040s, the Strategic 
Framework for the Pacific indicates the U.S. would “devise and 
implement a defense strategy capable of . . . defending the first-island-
 
 6 MICHAEL GREEN ET AL., COUNTERING COERCION IN MARITIME ASIA: 






 7 Idrees Ali, Chinese jets intercept U.S. surveillance plan: U.S. officials, REUTERS 
(July 24, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military/
chinese-jets-intercept-u-s-surveillance-plane-u-s-officials-idUSKBN1A91QE. 
 8 Laura Tingle, Previously secret details of Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy 
revealed, ABC NEWS (Jan. 12, 2021, 3:52 AM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-
01-12/details-of-trump-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy-revealed/13052216. 
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chain nations, including Taiwan.”9 Several days after President Biden’s 
inauguration, China flew eight nuclear-capable bombers and four 
fighter jets into the Taiwanese air defense identification zone,10 and 
passed a new law explicitly allowing its coastguard to fire on foreign 
vessels,11 described by Manila as a “verbal threat of war to any country 
that defies the [Chinese] law; which, if unchallenged, is submission to 
it.”12 While this may presage a future foreign policy challenge in the 
region, the technology for LAWS does not yet exist. However, as the 
sophistication of AI continues to expand at an exponential rate, it is 
not far-fetched to suggest a future president may encounter a scenario 
with similarities to the one envisioned in our thought experiment 
outlined below. Through an initial background of the case study, its re-
contextualization involving LAWS, and applications for policy 
development, the thought experiment intends to draw on past lessons 
to guide future leadership and security scenario reactions. 
 
 9 Cabinet Memorandum on the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indio-





 10 China flies nuclear-capable bombers, fighter jets over Taiwanese waters, ABC NEWS 
(Jan. 23, 2021, 8:22 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-23/china-flies-
nuclear-capable-bombers-and-jets-over-taiwan-waters/13086192; see also US says 
support for Taiwan ‘rock-solid’ as Chinese fighter jets enter defence zone for second day, SBS NEWS 





 11 China authorises coastguard to fire on foreign vessels in disputed waters of East China 
and South China Seas, ABC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2021, 5:37 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/
news/2021-01-23/china-authorises-coast-guard-to-fire-on-foreign-ships-if-
needed/13084754. 
 12 Philippines files protest over China’s new coastguard laws in South China Sea, ABC 
NEWS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-01-28/philippines-
protests-chinas-threat-of-war-coastguard-law/13096898. 
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A. Case Study 
As Beijing’s response to the April 2001 collision bears some 
similarities to the crisis of its embassy in Belgrade being struck by U.S. 
missiles in May 1999, it is worthwhile providing some context on the 
transition from President Clinton to President Bush as written from 
the perspective of the Chinese leadership. The leaders of Beijing 
believed the 1999 incident was an intentional act, whereas Washington 
made efforts to demonstrate the accident was attributed to human 
error.13 Memoirs of the incidents from China’s perspective are 
available, for example, from Qian Qichen (the then Vice-Premier of 
China). Recalling the “attack” on the embassy, which he believed could 
not have been a “mistake,” Qian asserted that “the midair collision 
seemed anything but accidental” because the “U.S. spy planes 
frequently had been flying close to Chinese territory in the South China 
Sea area.”14 
In addition, Tang Jiaxuan (the then Foreign Minister of China) 
provides a detailed account, from his anticipation of the Bush 
presidency to the thinking of Chinese leaders following the collision. 
“From the second half of 2000,” Tang recalls an increase in 
“reconnaissance flights along the edge of China’s waters.”15 Moreover, 
Bush’s rhetoric from a presidential debate had described China as a 
“strategic competitor” instead of a “strategic partner,” and Tang 
considered that, “it was disturbing to think about the possible adverse 
impact on China–U.S. relations should the Bush argument become the 
China policy of the U.S. government.”16 On 1 April, less than three 
months after Bush’s inauguration, the collision occurred between the 
two nations’ military aircraft. The Chinese pilot went missing, and the 
U.S. pilots performed an emergency landing on Hainan, where they 
were taken into custody by the Chinese authorities. The U.S. pilots 
considered themselves to be “like hostages,” although this 
characterization is disputed by Tang, who describes the status of the 
pilots as “neither tourists nor honored guests but intruders” who had 
 
 13 SUSAN L. SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 218 (2007). 
 14 QIAN QICHEN, TEN EPISODES IN CHINA’S DIPLOMACY 157 (2005). 
 15 TANG JIAXUAN, HEAVY STORM AND GENTLE BREEZE: A MEMOIR OF 
CHINA’S DIPLOMACY 328 (2011). 
 16 Id. at 330. 
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“constraints on them . . . to demand that they cooperate in the 
[Chinese] investigation.”17 Within days, three U.S. Navy destroyers 
were dispatched to the vicinity and the presidents of both countries 
made public statements. Meanwhile, a Chinese search-and-rescue 
operation involving one hundred thousand people was underway in 
the area.18 
Susan Shirk, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
responsible for China in the Clinton Administration, coordinated 
Washington’s interagency investigation into how the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade had been targeted, and determined that there was “a 
combination of errors” linked to a failure to follow processes.19 
However, Shirk notes the perception in China maintained that the U.S. 
had superior technology and management techniques, and therefore, 
according to this perception, human error could not account for the 
“mistake.”20 In a comparison of the two incidents, Shirk also notes, the 
Chinese media’s reporting on the airplane collision had “less enflamed 
rhetoric than they had used during the Belgrade embassy crisis.”21 
While the Chinese government had asked for students to stay on 
campus during the airplane crisis (where young people vented anti-
American sentiment on the internet), Beijing’s previous response 
during the Belgrade embassy crisis had been to organize buses from 
campuses to outside the U.S. embassy, where the students had thrown 
Molotov cocktails and bricks.22 In addition, according to a May 2013 
report commissioned by the Pentagon’s most senior strategist, the 
Chinese response during the crisis in April 2001 was sophisticated and 
exploited the U.S. media.23 In an analysis of coverage between Xinhua 
 
 17 Id. at 350. 
 18 Id. at 340–41. 
 19 SHIRK, supra note 13, at 218. 
 20 Id. 
 21 SHIRK, supra note 13, at 238. 
 22 Id. at 213–14, 237–39. 
 23 Peter Mattis, Chinese Propaganda and Positioning in the Sino-American Crises: 
The EP-3 and the Impeccable Case, in CHINA: THE THREE WARFARES 226–245 (Stefan 
Halper ed., 2013), http://images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_
%20The%20three%20warfares.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/2020110900345
0/http://images.smh.com.au/file/2014/04/11/5343124/China_%2520The%2520
three%2520warfares.pdf]; see also John Garnaut, US unsettled by China’s ‘three warfares’ 
strategy: Pentagon report, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 11, 2014), https://
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and the New York Times, international opinion was shaped through a 
campaign of influence which “juxtaposed Xinhua’s version of events 
with U.S. statements without subjecting either side to analytic scrutiny, 
giving Beijing’s propaganda pronouncements equal standing,” and 
thus it created a “false equivalency,”24 which shifted perceptions 
among some of the U.S. populace further toward the Chinese view. 
In a bilateral dispute of this nature, the number of positions is 
limited to just two: a position supported by either one party, or by both 
parties. Initially, the U.S. and China had maintained separate positions, 
accusing the other of fault. The U.S. later acquiesced to some elements 
maintained by the Chinese position, to such an extent that it created, 
“from a diplomatic or conflict resolution standpoint, constructive 
ambiguity.”25  
B. Contextualizing the case study 
The case study of the incident in April 2001, outlined above, 
provides a limited frame of reference and serves as an example for 
illustrative purposes only. As a thought experiment, contemplate if 
there was a collision between a human pilot and an uninhabited device 
(instead of colliding with another human or group of humans). A 
method to conduct this analysis would need to consider the potential 
variables – the states’ positions, the scenario in dispute, and the 
difficulty in reaching an outcome. Table 1 (below) considers a 
simplified hypothetical scenario if the U.S. EP-3 manned plane were 
replaced with an autonomous aircraft. A more comprehensive 
framework could, however, rely upon such an examination across 
multiple scenarios, developed by specialists to further consider the 
range of policy options available in advising leaders’ decision-making 




 24 Mattis, supra note 23, at 235, 240. 
 25 Kevin Avruch & Zheng Wang, Culture, Apology, and International Negotiation: 
The Case of the Sino-U.S. ‘Spy Plane’ Crisis, 10 INT’L NEGOT. 337, 345 (2005), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1571806054740958. 





Contentions and possible arguments for collision with an 
autonomous system 
Contention Argument in favor Argument against 
Human at fault Previous history of 
unsafe maneuvers 
from the pilot. 
Pilot has skills and 
experience (e.g., flight 
hours) to not make a 
fatal mistake. 
Machine at fault Software issues 
difficult to rule out 
due to algorithm 
‘length,’ or computer 
operation affected by 
hardware malfunction 
or other issues. 
Algorithm indicates 
the system adheres to 
codes of conduct and 
international law, and 
collectively it may have 
more ‘hours’ than any 
single human. 
Shared fault Military exchanges 
did not develop 
adequate policies to 
prevent incident. 
Machine may use 
components in a 
supply chain from 
both countries. 
One military did not 
follow advice received 
during exchange from 
the other. A state’s 
quality assurance 
processes were not 
adequate. 
Accident or causes 
unable to 
determined 
May be difficult to 
reach an objective 
finding if ‘black box’ 
(or equivalent type 
device) is unable to be 
recovered. 
Political matter with 
history and 
considerations that go 
beyond the technical 
aspects of the most 
recent incident. 
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Each row of the above table will be briefly discussed below. 
The first contention is where the human is at fault. Accounting 
for the uncertainties associated with new technology, it is likely that 
the government responsible for the manned plane would indicate the 
number of flight hours its pilot had undertaken in order to ‘prove’ the 
collision was not due to human error. The Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, 
had recorded 1,152 flying hours, “without incidents of negligence, 
oversights, or anything to indicate the possibility of an accident,” 
according to Tang’s account of the actual crisis.26 Yet, this would not 
rule out pilot error. In December 2000, the U.S. had complained about 
the PLA flying in close proximity. Moreover, weeks before the 
collision, Wang Wei harassed the U.S. crew by flying close enough to 
display something through the surface of his aircraft canopy; the U.S. 
later released a photo of Wang holding a piece of paper against his 
window, upon which he had written his email address as a taunt, which 
allowed the U.S. to describe Wang’s reputation as someone “known to 
the American EP-3 crews as a Top Gun-style hotdogger.”27 Clearly, the 
presence of an autonomous aircraft would not necessarily eliminate the 
possibility that a human could still have caused the incident. 
The second row of the table considers the possibility where the 
machine is at fault. In analyzing this hypothetical scenario, the 
proponents defending the autonomous aircraft could suggest the 
algorithm and hardware were demonstrably reliable. According to such 
a proposition, if the sensors were not faulty, and without mistakes in 
the programming, the LAWS could have conceivably followed 
international regulation and bilateral codes of conduct, ruling out 
machine error as the cause of the crash. If the other party submitted a 
request to verify the evidence in support of this claim, it may also be 
possible to do so, provided both states held the view that the matter 
could be resolved through an investigation on the technical aspects and 
without ‘politicizing’ the broader context, e.g., avoiding deliberation on 
previous encounters which would be considered outside the scope. 
 
 26 TANG, supra note 15, at 340. 
 27 SHIRK, supra note 13, at 237; see also Mattis, supra note 23, at 235. 
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Relying upon technical considerations as the sole criteria, 
however, is a risky proposition based on the precedent it creates. In 
the case of the May 1999 bombing of the embassy in Belgrade, China’s 
perception that U.S. technology was ‘superior’ did not allow its leaders 
to acknowledge U.S. officers had made mistakes in targeting the wrong 
building. Moreover, according to the argument by Chinese officials, 
the belief that machine error was not the cause, had the effect of 
exacerbating the crisis by suggesting that the incident ‘must’ therefore 
have been due to ‘intentional’ decisions by people. In the hypothetical 
experiment of an autonomous aircraft crashing with a human pilot, 
even if a machine had not been at fault in that specific case, elevating 
the status of technology above the level of humans creates a risk that 
future incidents are unable to be explained as machine error. 
Another justification for the machine not being at fault could 
be the policy of a state for their autonomous devices to protect military 
property. In this scenario, the device would effectively be relying upon 
an argument for self-defense. This aspect would be particularly 
important if, instead of a collision occurring, the machine, anticipating 
the possibility of its own destruction, had fired upon the manned 
aircraft and in the process, injured the pilot. On the other hand, the 
loss of an uninhabited device could be an alternative policy outcome 
by providing a moral justification to prevent the use-of-force against a 
human in peacetime. 
The contention in the third row of the table relates to fault 
being shared between the parties. Such a scenario would require the 
national interests of both sides to value the bilateral relationship. In 
addition, leaders would need to support the further deepening of 
military-to-military exchanges, including by a joint development of 
policies intended to mitigate the reoccurrence of such an incident. 
Even if fault could be attributed to both parties, it is unlikely to be an 
entirely equal ‘share’ of the blame. For example, it is possible one side 
could have called upon the other to make certain adjustments during 
previous ‘close calls,’ or that a greater portion of the hardware or 
software may originate from only one of the countries. 
The adoption of joint responsibility as an outcome would, 
nevertheless, most likely signify greater influence by foreign ministries 
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in seeking to reset the agenda in the interests of stabilizing the bilateral 
relationship, compared to the specialized role of the military where the 
protection of the life of enlisted personnel may be of a greater concern. 
In the hypothetical scenario, there would be less motivation for such 
intensive contact between militaries, and less incentive for a state to 
admit fault with the operation of the autonomous device and 
apologize. In April 2001, the U.S. led by its ambassador (who was 
himself a former navy pilot) sought extensive consultation with the 
Chinese foreign ministry to secure the release of the EP-3 crew. In the 
absence of prisoners, the injured nation may evaluate different 
retaliatory measures, in juxtaposition to a human being taken into 
custody. 
Finally, as noted in the fourth row of the table, the contention 
here would be that the collision was an accident or that the causes were 
unable to determined. In this scenario, it is probable that the matter 
would encompass political judgements that are beyond the scope of 
the stand-alone incident. Originating either due to a lack of evidence 
regarding the causes of the incident – or where a finding indicated that 
the incident occurred despite the proper adherence to process by all 
parties – in this scenario it may be possible to allow for a political 
consensus to be reached with greater ease. While the prospect that a 
future incident may be unable to be avoided due to an absence of 
‘lessons learned,’ and could thereby appear to be unsatisfying, this 
outcome would not necessarily preclude the benefits of remediation 
efforts that could arise in response to the ‘shared fault’ scenario. 
Conversely, it may even be convenient (for some actors) to not find 
evidence during their investigation, which could suggest a ‘human at 
fault’ or ‘machine at fault’ contention and, thus, a rearrangement of the 
political circumstances to something less neutral. 
C. Drawing applications from the case study 
Evidently, the presence of autonomous devices in the future 
would make such decision-making even more difficult than it is today. 
Given the intense uncertainty that decisionmakers will potentially 
confront when evaluating and ultimately reacting to such scenarios – 
perhaps in time-critical situations – it is essential they recognize all 
possibilities of human or machine error and the broader milieu before 
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rushing to any conclusion. As the precipitous speed and intensification 
of technology progresses in the digital age, political leaders will 
encounter circumstances requiring determinations involving 
uncertainty inherent to incidents where LAWS are likely to be 
involved. 
If a dispute involving LAWS escalates, leaders should continue 
to communicate with their counterparts, when feasible, to prevent 
miscalculation if there is continued ambiguity. The establishment or 
use of a ‘hotline’ could provide logistical capabilities. However, its 
presence may indicate only a pre-determined intention to 
communicate, rather than facilitate a pathway toward a successful 
resolution. Some leaders may even be unwilling to pick up the phone 
as a negotiation tactic. While states undoubtedly could reciprocate 
against hostile force, human assessment is necessary before scaling up 
the antagonism as LAWS could not make these judgments objectively. 
Ultimately, while the Charter of the United Nations does not place 
restrictions on states’ intrinsic rights to individual or collective self-
defense against an armed attack until the UNSC takes measures to 
restore international peace and security, state responses should 
nevertheless demonstrate military necessity, proportionality, and 
clearly distinguish the enemy combatants from non-military targets in 
accordance with the principles of Just War.28 Furthermore, the 
Guiding Principles developed by the Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) have “affirmed that international law, in particular the UN 
Charter and international humanitarian law,” will guide the work 
towards an outcome on LAWS through the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW). The status of the principles, however, 
is not currently legally binding, and thereby it remains unclear as to 
whether the international community has an appetite to introduce 
stricter rules in this area.29 
 
 28 Peter M. Asaro, How Just Could a Robot War Be?, in CURRENT ISSUES IN 
COMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 55 (Adam Briggle et al. eds., 2008). 
 29 Report of the 2019 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging 
Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, at 13, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3 (Sept. 25, 2019), https://undocs.org/en/CCW/GGE.1/
2019/3 [http://web.archive.org/web/20200919072200/https://undocs.org/en/
CCW/GGE.1/2019/3]. 
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As the article will illuminate further, the proliferation of 
autonomy in AI is already establishing uncertain benchmarks for a 
largely untested military technology, with some of these consequences 
becoming foreseeable in the form of leadership reactions to ambiguous 
security scenarios. Having considered the broader context and 
variables at the top of the chain-of-command in the section above, the 
next section focuses on the officer level. It presents a set of measures 
aimed at decreasing the scope of unintentional war through enhanced 
collaborative rules, before an incident escalates into a crisis requiring 
decision-making to move from the military to political levels. 
II. DECREASING THE PROBABILITY OF UNINTENTIONAL WAR VIA 
ENHANCED COLLABORATIVE RULES 
Militaries can redefine the security environment they inhabit 
by discovering areas for collaborative development with each other. 
The precepts of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Rules 
of Engagement (ROE) are generally well understood as they apply to 
various professions. Among other potential areas for collaboration, 
regulations such as IHL and ROE will need to be clarified from a 
legislative standpoint and converted into ‘zeroes and ones,’ which 
would allow a robot to implement the programs in the intended 
manner of its instructions. It is more likely such a process would face 
challenges similar to those which already exist today. Digital tools to 
calculate and reduce collateral damage have been used by the U.S. 
Department of Defense since at least 2003.30 Yet, while software to 
assist officers with estimating the collateral damage is based on 
particular variables, it currently does not provide an answer to all of 
the requirements to make a decision, such as military necessity.31 Of 
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course, even if IHL and ROE could be agreed upon by legal scholars 
in collaboration with software developers, in general, algorithms tend 
to have some flaws which become evident during their use. The 
probability of a mistake being coded into such a program to execute a 
legal decision by LAWS, will require the highest level of scrutiny. 
We therefore recommend applying collaborative principles in 
this area to foster greater exchanges between states’ militaries, 
including those engaged at the officer level. Developing a shared 
understanding could promote a higher level of assurance than perhaps 
could be indicated inhouse or by a contracted audit partner alone. That 
said, there are seemingly contradictory priorities between being 
‘completely’ transparent and maintaining information that would fast-
track an adversary’s development for their own technologies. Each 
state will need to make its own judgment relating to their appropriate 
management of risks. The forfeiture of confidential information 
relating to the legal assessments of IHL and ROE compliance by a 
machine, may otherwise decrease the probability of inadvertent 
outcomes occurring from disputes involving LAWS. These would 
include the possibility of a confrontation between two sets of opposing 
LAWS where each nation state has deployed a model with proprietary 
legal interpretations. 
Specific models may be tailored to a particular state’s national 
interest within the architecture of global governance. While informal 
dialogue certainly could assist in the early stages of development, a 
treaty may promote a broader level of consensus. Alternatively, states 
may proclaim to observe key components as a matter of policy, while 
some activities remain separated from the agreement in specific and 
limited circumstances. The CCW has a total of 125 state parties and 
four signatories; however, this number is also spread across different 
protocols. For example, only 86 states have signed up to Amended 
Article I, which extends the application of the CCW and its protocols 
to non-international armed conflicts, whereas an additional 32 states 
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Therefore, even within a model shaped through the architecture of the 
United Nations, state parties can join over time and, thus, increase the 
universality of an arms control regime progressively. As the next 
section will also indicate with reference to the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR), an agreement outside of the United Nations 
can still influence global norms when its design and legacy are given 
legitimacy or recognition by peak UN bodies. Evidently, the pursuit of 
a common goal can be achieved through collaborative efforts on an 
essentially non-binding basis, without prejudice to the national interest 
or commitments to an agreement that ‘locks in’ a future administration 
to potentially irreversible national security risks. 
Militaries may also choose to reach an in-principle 
understanding with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
further their implementation of IHL and ROE. An advantage is how 
such an approach could conceivably provide for the external detection 
of inaccuracies that were ‘missed’ during a preliminary self-assessment, 
or to provide additional assurance to humanitarian workers on the 
compliance of LAWS as new (but verifiable) weapons. Noting the 
current discussions on the framing of LAWS in legal versus ethical 
terminologies,33 such talks could also consider the compliance aspects 
of machine autonomy from a non-theoretical perspective. For 
example, while an algorithm should be able to visualize and 
acknowledge the unique status of non-combatants, NGO workers 
voluntarily could provide military officials with information on their 
activities to update the databases used to qualify the legality of a strike. 
As noted by Lieutenant Colonels John Cherry and Christopher 
Korpela, BONUS sub-munitions are advanced enough to compare an 
image of a target to their databases and self-destruct in the middle of 
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vehicle.34 As stated, “munitions such as a BONUS round properly 
employed by a commander and other similar technologies are the 
current and future of LAWS, not killer robots detached from 
command and control.”35 
In this manner, NGOs which otherwise may have reluctance 
to provide their assistance in areas of conflict, would have an 
opportunity to collaboratively develop protections for use by 
humanitarian workers who may not believe LAWS inherently possess 
the proper situational awareness and capability for distinction, 
compared with humans. While such actions alone are a small 
component of the requirements for ‘meaningful human control,’ they 
could also assist with weapons review processes before and throughout 
deployment. Yet, the premeditated distortion of this system “would 
arguably amount to perfidy,”36 which could be considered under IHL 
to “betray the confidence of the adversary” through “simulation of 
protected status,” and depending on the circumstances, may be 
considered as a war crime.37 
Nevertheless, effectively validating compliance with IHL and 
ROE does not necessarily overcome the dangers arising from LAWS 
failing to have enough circumstantial awareness. Some actions are 
symbolic but can be crucial for sending a warning. As indicated in the 
previous section, the actions by Wang Wei in his previous flights could 
have multiple interpretations. While the U.S. interpretation had been 
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that Wang was ‘taunting’ its crew, in the view of the Chinese, he may 
have been warning them. Going back even further into history, 
simulated attacks from the USSR had “enable[d] U.S. commanders to 
recognize these attacks during crises” and thus provided “an ‘action 
language’ for signaling their U.S. adversaries and American political 
leaders.”38 
Although the above proposals on decreasing the probability of 
unintentional war via enhanced collaborative tools primarily relate to 
LAWS not possessing the requisite recognition in the context of 
signaling, it is worth noting that leaders may not yet have come to a 
common understanding on how the deployment of LAWS could, 
itself, be used as a signal. Further underscoring the continued use of 
messaging in heightened security crises, one of the policies of the U.S. 
today is to “deter regional aggression and assure distant allies” through 
the flights of bomber aircraft which provide “effective signaling for 
deterrence and assurance.”39 In the forthcoming years, one leader may 
need to determine how the presence of LAWS could impact another’s 
perceptions. Would the deployment of LAWS be a similar threshold? 
Thirty states have so far have called for a ban on fully autonomous 
weapons,40 and they may hold different perceptions than nations 
considering the potential benefits that may arise from developing such 
autonomous systems. 
Furthermore, people may also need to consider how robots 
‘themselves’ may signal an adversary. As both states would have an 
interest in preventing an inadvertent conflict that leads to unplanned 
escalation, political and military strategists should consider what 
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customs are likely to eventuate from the introduction of this emerging 
technology. By means of ensuring a ‘failsafe’ is available in the event 
of ambiguous signaling, it may be worthwhile to have communications 
infrastructure between the humans who administer or oversee the 
LAWS. The essential factor is humans preserving the ability to 
communicate with their opponent. Assuming the political and military 
leadership supported such a proposal, the method would need to be 
reached technically. One option may include having centralized 
databases for communications across certain geographical regions, as 
agreed by a treaty between two or more countries. Another pathway 
may allow for one LAWS in proximity to another to pass on messages 
sent between the respective human counterparts. In yet another 
scenario, following misinterpretation between a human and the LAWS 
that could result in the LAWS not understanding a signal of intent, the 
human could seek to send a standardized ‘message-alert’ through the 
LAWS to its human commander, who may possess the disposition to 
avert escalation or mitigate the scale of retaliation. Implementation of 
the above measures should, thereby, decrease the likelihood of 
unintentional actions from LAWS or avert unnecessary escalation. 
The creation of the requisite infrastructure for such 
transmissions would be complicated in certain types of conditions, 
such as underwater. As Krepinevich notes, “It seems plausible that, 
given the cost disparity” between autonomous weapons compared to 
submarines, “maritime competitors could arm and deploy them as 
undersea ‘kamikaze’ devices or delivery systems” for anti-submarine 
warfare.41 However, the underwater links needed for the observation 
of such devices would be difficult to construct, not to mention who 
wears the cost. Unlike land or aerial systems, maritime operations will 
have greater difficulties with relaying data signals.42 Nevertheless, 
innovations in the area of underwater communications indicate some 
possibilities for considering the development of “hydrospatial 
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infrastructure”43 with shared applications. Enabling such an 
autonomous device to remain surreptitious inside of a delineated area 
may be possible while maintaining infrastructure for an enhanced set 
of collaborative rules. While not a military example, the voyage of 
filmmaker and explorer James Cameron to the Mariana Trench, the 
deepest point in the ocean, demonstrated how a civilian was able to 
remain in constant contact with the surface via an underwater 
telephone, respond to a voice message from his partner, and send a 
tweet from that location.44 Communication with underwater LAWS 
would be significantly less cost-effective if each nation pursued 
separate programs that were, nevertheless, intended to permit 
communication with each other’s officers. Most concerning would be 
a scenario that involves states having no control over their underwater 
deployed autonomous systems, ruling out the suggestions we have 
articulated in the above pertaining to decreasing the probability of 
unintentional war. 
In summary, a common understanding of how robots would 
be programmed by nation states to interpret and respond to their 
environment will increase the capacity to approximate more precisely, 
the extent to which LAWS would react proportionately to hostilities. 
And further, the capacity to undertake the requisite actions in 
fulfilment of political and military objectives. Such efforts would spur 
reciprocal understanding and lessen some of the capriciousness of 
robot-to-robot encounters. The implementation of common 
guidelines and legal understandings through its most open approach 
would involve collaboration across the public, private, and non-
governmental sectors, and may even use the principles of an open-
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source approach, such as observed with the creation and maintenance 
of internet standards.45 A more targeted option, however, would 
involve military exchanges and dialogue with relevant NGOs. Overall, 
these essentially non-binding initiatives could lessen the scope of 
miscalculation, or otherwise provide a means to simplify the different 
probabilities of how LAWS could, respectively, administer IHL in their 
own way. 
III. IMPLEMENTING RESTRICTIONS ON LAWS IN CONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE 
One benefit of LAWS would be their capacity for traversing regions 
or conditions beyond human tolerance. If the power source were 
adequate to fuel the operating system and hardware, and human-
assisted maintenance were not required during a particular mission, 
LAWS could withstand heat and freezing temperatures in desert 
environments for an extended period, the pressures of deep-sea ocean 
diving, navigate across high altitudes, or protect satellites through use 
as a robotic spaceplane across various orbits. For some operations, 
LAWS may only need to contain munitions specific to the mission 
parameters; for instance, in an urban environment where close combat 
is expected, small arms would be more appropriate than artillery.46 The 
dilution of weapons that a machine far more powerful than a person 
may carry, could assist states to comply with IHL-related elements 
pertaining to the proportionate use-of-force. Consequently, 
classifications of LAWS would have a distinctive set of risk 
management guidelines once consensus is reached on separate 
categories and a method is devised to safeguard arms sales from 
surpassing such thresholds. As indicated above, separate articles or 
protocols could exist under the framework of an overarching arms 
control agreement to allow for governance and regulations on different 
types of autonomous weapons. These variations may promote action 
at first where it is easier to reach an agreement – for example, sparsely 
populated areas where the risk to civilians is much lower – before more 
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complex tasks can be considered and the principle of distinction is 
more difficult for LAWS to observe. 
Upon joining the CCW, states parties agree to “the principle 
of international law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to 
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited,” and thus 
prohibit or restrict “the use of weapons which may be deemed to be 
excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects.”47 For example, 
the protocols of the CCW restrict usage of incendiary weapons, 
landmines, non-detectable fragments, and blinding lasers.48 The CCW 
promotes disarmament by banning or limiting the use of weapons 
which may be indiscriminate or cause disproportionate damage or 
casualties, and it can be revised with additional protocols to “respond 
to new developments in weapons technology and challenges in armed 
conflicts.”49 From 2014 to 2016, through meetings held under the 
CCW, the United Nations assembled yearly informal Meetings of 
Experts on LAWS.50 Its original decree was “to discuss the questions 
related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous 
weapons systems, in the context of the objectives and purposes of the 
Convention,” and dialogue encompassing technical issues, ethics and 
sociology, international law, and military aspects.51 
Since 2017, discussions have continued through the GGE on 
emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.52 The CCW seemed the 
most plausible setting for a protocol on LAWS, although the 
Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, a coalition of NGOs, has called on 
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states to launch formal negotiations no later than the CCW’s Review 
Conference in December 2021, warning that “failure to do so would 
fatally undermine public trust and confidence in the CCW framework’s 
ability to solve this challenge.”53 Although decision-making through 
the CCW theoretically needs to achieve only a simple majority vote 
(rather than consensus) to create a legally binding instrument, Rosert 
and Sauer’s analysis of the Campaign’s strategy finds it has missed “the 
most straightforward argument,” which they suggest should be “not a 
legal but an ethical one . . . less susceptible to consequentialist counter-
positions (which argue that the illegality of LAWS will be remedied by 
technological progress).”54 Based on the possibility of failure to reach 
an agreement by the end of 2021, two other options – outside of the 
framework of the CCW – are considered below. 
The MTCR has “set an effective international standard” and 
“international benchmark” for national export control. Its guidelines 
and technical annex allow for “adherence to a common export policy” 
and can assist with the obligation on all states to implement UNSC 
Resolution 1540,55 including the adoption of the MTCR standards by 
the United Nations.56 The MTCR is “unique in its focus on the means 
of delivery” of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) “rather than the 
WMD themselves,” promoting best practices among its membership 
and, significantly, through outreach activities to non-members.57 Since 
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its establishment more than thirty years ago, participation has increased 
to 35 countries,58 including France, Germany, India, Russia, Turkey, 
South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.59 For a comparison 
using the same number, the MTCR membership accounts for a large 
portion of the top 35 arms exporting countries in the world (71%), and 
most of its value (92%).60 Outreach activities are also conducted with 
non-members, including China and Israel (which rank as the fourth 
and ninth largest arms suppliers globally).61  
Keeping stride with technical innovations and advancements 
via frequent updates, the MTCR harmonizes rules without disrupting 
legitimate trade, and the incoming Chair has indicated the privatization 
of space programs is an emerging area with “substantial technological 
overlap between the technology used to transport satellites into space 
and that used to deliver WMD.”62 The MTCR presently defines a 
threshold on specific weapons, including rockets, unmanned aerial 
vehicle systems, and associated technologies adept to transporting 
WMDs or any payload of at least 500 kg (1102 lbs.) up to a distance of 
at least 300 km (186 miles).63 LAWS, as uninhabited devices, could 
arguably be perceived to meet these criterion, implying their 
proliferation already may be constrained under the MTCR. The model, 
consequently, demonstrates its capacity to tackle the challenges 
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emanating from the acquisition risks of LAWS with larger payloads. 
Conceivably, this form of informal model of partnership by states, with 
national responsibility (and control) over the implementation of policy, 
may be suitable for the regular updates of technical facets, creating best 
practice, and encouraging state participation on a voluntary basis. 
Despite the lack of official verification requirements compared 
to some other arms control treaties, each state may pass laws or adopt 
a policy to address breaches, and in essence, give ‘teeth’ to the accord. 
For example, the President of the United States may impose sanctions 
to deny contracts or licenses to foreign persons engaging in the trade 
or facilitation of MTCR equipment or technology, or conspiring to do 
so.64 As an interesting historical parallel, President George H. W. Bush 
sought China’s commitment to arms proliferation prevention, with 
Beijing promising to abide by the MTCR Guidelines and Annex in 
return for the U.S. lifting a ban on the export of satellites to China, a 
negotiation which then-Foreign Minister Qian considered as marking 
“the beginning of the lifting of sanctions that had been imposed on 
China by the United States and other Western countries for two years 
or more [since 1989].”65 Furthermore, the regime promotes 
accountability because members are unable to undermine one another. 
Where an MTCR participant adheres to their obligation to not export 
a banned item, they will need to be communicated with before a 
comparable item can be sold by another member, with authorizing 
conditions set out in the Guidelines.66 Such a mechanism has 
significant benefits in promoting rules-based trading and as noted 
above, is the ‘norm’ amongst the biggest arms suppliers in the world. 
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Whereas the MTCR focuses on WMD proliferation and 
associated delivery systems, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on 
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies may better suit the nature of LAWS through a 
nonstrategic weapons ‘prism.’ The WA encompasses the same 
membership as the MTCR (excluding two MTCR members – Brazil 
and Iceland), while Mexico and eight additional European countries 
(Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) are members of the WA solely.67 Considering some 
technologies – many of which are now available to civilians – can have 
their origins traced to inventions for military purposes, applying a 
framework on dual-use technologies can be deemed a viable approach 
for managing such a transition over time; although it is essential to 
qualify that it can also have inadvertent consequences which must be 
factored into the calculation. Chertoff recommends applying the WA 
as “a ready platform for the near-term creation of a new export control 
on LAWS and critical LAWS components” to “reduce the risk of 
transfer to malicious non-state actors,” but notes the WA had once 
“accidentally criminali[z]ed many of the necessary tools for stopping 
malware” until an amendment was later created to address this error.68 
In comparing the MTCR and WA as optional models for arms control 
sitting outside of the CCW framework, a distinction is the obligation 
of members to inform the WA secretariat once they finalize an export 
which hitherto had been rejected by a different participant. This is in 
stark contrast to the requirements under the MTCR which calls for 
consultation between participants prior to the supply of listed 
armaments.69 
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Given the improbability of constraints on LAWS being 
negotiated before the CCW’s Review Conference is held in December 
2021, discussions on the regulation of autonomous systems could 
advance into a new direction, perhaps incorporating the arms control 
model of the MTCR or the WA. A key risk is that where robots are 
dual-use and states are unwilling to place prohibitions on their civilian 
industries. For example, a statement by Japan in 2020 warned of a 
“chilling effect” that would “hinder[] technological development and 
innovation in the civil sectors,” should restrictive rules be developed.70 
Furthermore, ensuring adequate capacity to detect and trace a person 
in urgent need of being rescued, such as during or following a disaster, 
is analogous to providing humanitarian assistance that lawfully cannot 
be denied during wartime. The export lists of the above arms control 
agreements are further mitigation instruments to lessen the 
misappropriation of LAWS, provided absolute prohibition is not 
adopted as a CCW additional protocol. 
Certainly, granted the amount of consensus it usually takes to 
complete arms control agreements, an additional option is for the 
states adept in researching the highly complex technologies necessary 
to develop LAWS, to execute a tailored approach that meets current 
needs, and would seek to expand the membership and rules over time. 
They could incorporate a sunset clause to incentivize the remainder of 
the international community to come to the negotiation table, 
conceivably through the United Nations. An imminent expiry can 
galvanize action as leaders respond with a greater sense of urgency, 
such as during President Biden’s first phone call with President Putin 
in January 2021, where both leaders indicated their “willingness to 
extend New START for five years, agreeing to have their teams work 
urgently to complete the extension by February 5,”71 the date the 
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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was set to expire. Containing any 
experiences discovered from an initial agreement on LAWS, a 
mechanism later developed would also be a useful way to ‘update’ the 
agreement before its preparation for signature and represents 
incremental steps toward an ongoing and marked challenge in 
decreasing, as the title of this article denotes, unintentional war. 
CONCLUSION 
Developing advanced technology that gives an advantage in 
the battlefield is an expensive element of military strategy, yet in many 
ways, it can be more costly to not do so at all. In the case of LAWS, 
these devices may increase the capabilities of armed forces by 
countering a greater quantum of threats presented by opponents. 
Nonetheless, for as long as autonomous systems will remain an 
untested or low-maturity technology, they would harbor the risk of 
unintentional attacks, possibly inciting greater volatility. Therefore, the 
emergence of LAWS has clearly engendered an ongoing political 
challenge. In the above contemplation, we have suggested an approach 
for decreasing the dangers emanating from the potential misuse of 
LAWS. The anticipated result of considerations is the lessening of the 
probability of unintentional war. 
We began with discussion of leadership and security scenario 
reactions, focusing on the response of newly sworn-in leaders to a 
potential military crisis. As indicated in the case study, U.S. presidents 
have faced such incidents with reference to negotiating ‘provocations’ 
with Chinese leaders early into their first term since the inauguration 
of President George W. Bush in 2001. While President Biden will 
certainly not face a decision where it is unclear if an uninhabited device 
had caused an incident, the exponential growth in AI suggests a 
Commander-in-Chief may one day face a relatively ambiguous 
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modelled on a previous collision elaborated on some of the envisaged 
changes to diplomacy that may result. One outcome is clear: If the use 
of LAWS is based on the premise that robots could possess enhanced 
skills compared to humans, political leaders may find it difficult to 
provide a justification for machine failure, particularly if attempting to 
explain the actions committed by such a device as unintentional. 
The second section considered enhanced collaboration rules to 
decrease the probability of unintentional war. Placing an emphasis on 
non-binding efforts to identify some common interests among parties, 
including adversaries, proposals were provided in the form of 
promoting mutual understanding of algorithmic interpretations of the 
regulations governing conduct in war, as well as protections for 
humanitarian workers. Furthermore, other areas were contemplated, 
such as the funding challenges (and potential collaboration 
opportunities) associated with hydrospatial infrastructure projects that 
would be required for the use of LAWS in underwater domains. 
The final section considered arms control frameworks under 
which a mechanism on LAWS could be developed. Campaigners are 
calling for negotiation on LAWS to begin ahead of the CCW’s Review 
Conference in December 2021.72 While this timeframe may produce a 
sense of urgency that provides for more substantive discussions during 
the next GGE, if this target is not met, it may dent the credibility of 
the CCW (in the eyes of some participating NGOs) as a forum for 
responding to emerging technologies. The MTCR, which meets non-
proliferation standards recognized by the UNSC and has outreach 
activities that include even those large arms exporters who are not its 
members, was proposed as a model designed to promote responsible 
adherence by participants. The WA, which has broader membership, 
may also be considered as an arms control mechanism due to its focus 
on dual-use technologies, which certainly would apply to the fields of 
AI and robotics. 
In examining how these governance options and 
considerations for regulating LAWS may help states to prepare for an 
already uncertain future, the principal motivation outlined above has 
 
 72 CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, supra note 54, at 2. 
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been for states to find a means to collaborate in order to decrease the 
probability of an unintentional war. The postwar rules-based order of 
global governance, bolstered by the concert architecture of five 
designated powers presiding over the veto of the UNSC, gives 
“authority and responsibility” for “action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”73 While 
imperfect, this relationship has in many instances generated incentives 
to pursue increased measures and, as the title of this article denotes, 
must now contribute to decreasing unintentional war through 
incremental steps and the greater universalization of arms control 
mechanisms. 
 
 73 U.N Charter art. 51, ¶ 1. 
